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KEYNOTE ADDRESS* 
“THE JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION  
OF EVERY ACTION?” 
HAROLD HONGJU KOH† 
On this seventy-fifth birthday of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it 
is worth noting that the Rules are that rare public document that contains 
within its text the very metric for measuring its own success. Contrast, for 
example, the U.S. Constitution, which aims “to . . . secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity”1—an outcome not easily meas-
ured. But the Federal Rules say simply—in a phrase I first heard on my first 
day studying civil procedure—that they shall be construed and administered 
to achieve “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”2  
I have puzzled over this phrase during more than thirty years of teaching 
procedure: I spent twenty representing human rights plaintiffs, ten years in 
the U.S. Government, usually representing defendants or amici in interna-
tional and foreign relations disputes, and five years as a law school dean, 
considering how the legal academy should teach both procedure and globalization. 
   This anniversary raises three questions: First, after seventy-five years 
of these Rules, have the Rules satisfied their own standard? Second, if they 
 
* This is a lightly footnoted adaptation of the Keynote Address that was delivered on November 
16, 2013 for the University of Pennsylvania Law Review’s “Federal Rules at 75” Symposium at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am deeply grateful to the editors of the Law Review and 
to my friends, Professors Stephen Burbank, Tobias Wolff, Catherine Struve, and Dean Michael 
Fitts, for inviting me to Philadelphia, and to Judge Lee Rosenthal for her extraordinary introduc-
tion and friendship. I dedicate this keynote to my “Fathers-in-Procedure,” Arthur Miller and 
Geoffrey Hazard, who introduced me to the world of procedure at Harvard and Yale, respectively, 
and instilled in me a love of procedure that has stayed with me for more than three decades.  See 
generally Harold Hongju Koh, Tribute, Hazard, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2010).  
† Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale Law School.  
1 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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have not, why not? And third, what does the future hold for the Rules, 
particularly as they face the challenge of globalization?  
First, have the Rules in fact achieved the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action? This Symposium presents a remarkable set 
of Articles commissioned to answer this very question. Do these rules 
promote “just” determinations or outcomes characterized by equality, 3 
participation, and fairness? Judith Resnik’s article on citizen access for 
private enforcement 4  and Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg’s 
consideration of “plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court”5 express concern 
about whether the Rules actually promote equality. Alex Reinert’s article 
further explores whether the Rules still ensure a meaningful day in court 
before a jury of one’s peers.6  These articles make clear that the phenome-
non of the “vanishing trial” is not easily squared with the Rules’ rhetorical 
commitment to resolution of disputes on the merits rather than on technicalities. 
How speedy are these determinations? In 1951, the median time from 
filing to disposition for tried cases was 12.2 months. In 1962, that number 
was sixteen months. Since 1990, the median time to disposition for all 
terminated cases is only seven to eight months. But as of 2012, the median 
time from filing to disposition remains twenty-three months in those cases 
where there is a trial, which, of course, these days are only one percent of all 
cases.7 
Are these determinations inexpensive?  A recent Federal Judicial Center 
study suggests that, in fact, higher litigation costs have resulted from a 
number of factors, including higher litigation stakes, longer processing 
times, attorneys’ fees,8 e-discovery, large firm engagement, case complexity, 
and a series of nonmonetary collateral issues.9 
Finally, what about reaching a final “determination” of every action? 
Even as we have more terminations, our current system seems to give us 
 
3 See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1865 (2002). 
4 Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793 (2014). 
 5 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court (Dec. 26, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
6 Alex Reinert, The Burdens of Pleading, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1767 (2014). 
7 These statistics are from Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American 
Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014).  
8 See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Attorneys’ Fees in a Loser-
Pays System, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2014). 
9 See generally EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION 
COSTS IN CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (2010). 
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fewer determinations. In 2013, only slightly over one percent of more than 
250,000 civil terminations in the federal courts over the previous twelve 
consecutive months occurred after reaching trial.10 As Owen Fiss recognized 
three decades ago, such statistics call into question whether settlement is 
invariably a good thing, and whether, in too many cases, a fixation on 
achieving settlement has prioritized clearing dockets over doing justice.11 
In sum, even by the Rules’ own standard, the interim report card seems 
decidedly mixed: Is today’s civil process just? Sometimes no. Is it speedy? 
Relatively. Inexpensive? Not really. Are there determinations of every 
action? Terminations, yes, but not necessarily “determinations.”  
Nearly eighty years ago, Charles Clark, my revered predecessor as Dean 
of Yale Law School, suggested three basic premises by which the Rules’ 
drafters intended the Rules to promote justice:12 first, simplicity of plain, 
nontechnical language; second, trans-substantivity13—as expressed in the 
famous phrase, “[t]here shall be one form of action—the civil action”; and 
third, a liberal philosophy with regard to construction, amendment, joinder, 
discovery, and party control, all designed to lower barriers to trial and to 
promote adjudication on the merits, not on the pleadings. 
Justice Hugo Black, in language that was later dropped from his land-
mark opinion in Conley v. Gibson, made plain that: “The Federal 
Rules . . . accept the principle that pleadings simply serve as a useful 
means to facilitate a proper decision on the merits. . . . Under [Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8] the best cause, not the cleverest pleader, is to 
prevail.”14 Later, in Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., Justice Black affirmed 
that “[t]he basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice 
through fair trials, not through summary dismissals as necessary as they 
may be on occasion.”15 
 
10  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATIS-
TICS: MARCH 31, 2013 tbl.C-4 (2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/ 
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2013/tables/C04Mar13.pdf. 
11 Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984). 
12 Compare Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1941–1943), with Charles E. 
Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517 (1925). 
13 This now-canonical term was coined in Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Re-
flections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). See generally Robert G. Bone, Securing the 
Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1155 (2006). 
14 Hugo L. Black, First Draft Opinion in Conley v. Gibson 7 (on file with Library of Con-
gress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 332). 
15 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966). 
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Given this high rhetoric and lofty aspiration, why do so few cases ever 
get to trial today? One might call it the “8-12-23-56 problem.”16 Fewer cases 
get to trial after Twombly17 and Iqbal,18 sometimes referred to jointly as 
Twiqbal, because they are dismissed on the pleadings under Federal Rules 8 
and 12. 19  Twiqbal’s new requirements of “plausibility pleading” impose 
severe information asymmetries upon civil rights and human rights plain-
tiffs who are expected at the outset of actions to offer nearly conclusive 
demonstrations of defendants’ intent.20 As Tobias Wolff ’s article discusses, 
after Wal-Mart, Comcast, Concepcion, and American Express, aggregate cases 
increasingly are not certified as classes under Rule 23 or are decertified after 
initial class action certification.21 Under Rule 56, as interpreted by the 
Celotex trilogy,22 cases are dismissed at summary judgment or managed to a 
single issue and settled. They are foreclosed because of judicial gatekeeping 
of expert evidence under the Supreme Court’s standard in Daubert.23 More 
cases are diverted to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act;24 and 
more cases are dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction—subject matter or 
personal—whether for a lack of specific jurisdiction after McIntyre25 or for a 
lack of general jurisdiction after Goodyear.26 
 
16 This numerical formulation borrows from Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the 
General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1731 (2014). 
17 Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).   
18 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  
19 Cf. Reinert, supra note 6.  
20 Cf. Rodger D. Citron, A Life in the Law: An Interview with Drew Days, 30 TOURO L. REV. 
153, 175 (2014) (“Twombly and Iqbal were transparently about limiting access to courts; [Iqbal has] 
shifted the focus from the summary judgment stage back to the pleading stage, the actual filing of 
the complaint . . . . I have no doubt that even if cases are still being heard that are fairly thin in 
terms of the allegations . . . the word is out that the federal courts are not hospitable to certain 
types of . . . claims. And so why go there? What is the point? And I think that has been very, 
very unfortunate. Both Twombly and Iqbal have done real damage.” (quoting Drew S. Days, III, 
former Solicitor General and Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division)). See 
generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties, 162 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1663 (2014). 
21 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Discretion in Class Certification, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897 (2014).  
22 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). See generally 
Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens 
Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81 (2006). 
23 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U L. Rev. 286, 313 (2013). 
24 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
25 J. MacIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
26 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
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Severally, none of these phenomena may be entirely new, but what are 
their collective consequences? In three quarters of a century, we have moved 
from a culture of trial to a culture of settlement and dismissal. Cases are 
terminated earlier based on less information about the claim, the evidence, 
or the merits. And the values of efficiency and cost reduction have been 
privileged over other systemic values, particularly the dignitary notion that 
every litigant deserves his or her day in court. 
This tangled evolution is perhaps best synthesized in Arthur Miller’s 
magisterial New York University Professorship lecture, which I commend 
both because of the completeness of his analysis and the passion of his 
discussion.27 His questions obviously were: Is this really our conception of 
due process? 28  Does this privilege Posner’s blunt notion of cost-
minimization29 over Michelman’s30 and Mashaw’s31 emphasis on fraternal 
values like dignity and participation? Do we really want our system of 
procedure to privilege instrumental, Benthamite notions of due process 
based on cost–benefit analysis over intrinsic Kantian notions of dignitary fairness? 
In such a world, who loses? Plaintiffs and under-resourced litigants lose, 
juries almost never sit to decide cases, and novel claims lose. Perhaps the 
greatest loss is that judges give up their traditional function as adjudicators 
and become “terminators.” As Judge William Young said at this Symposium, 
judges sit to close cases; they are increasingly seen and see themselves as 
gatekeepers, managers who administer techniques of settlement and dismissal.  
When you cannot measure what is important, you tend to make important 
what you can measure. And so like anyone else in the workplace, judges 
tend to do what is measured, and what is measured and valued in today’s 
courthouses is how many cases are closed, not how justly they are decided.  
Obviously, 1938 was a simpler world, dominated by bipolar, adversarial, 
and private law adjudication, what Abram Chayes32 and Richard Marcus33 
called “our received tradition”—private claims, simple party structures, and 
 
27 Arthur R. Miller, University Professorship Lecture at New York University School of Law: 
Are They Closing the Courthouse Doors? (Mar. 19, 2012), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ 
sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_072088.pdf. 
28 Cf. Subrin & Main, supra note 7.  
29 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).  
30 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's 
Rights (pts. 1 & 2), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527. 
31 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985). 
32 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term—Foreword, Public Law Litigation and the 
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).  
33 See generally Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691 (2014). 
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passive judicial decisionmakers dedicated to private dispute resolution based 
on a retrospective damages remedy. 
But we all know that the rules have necessarily adapted to rapid changes 
in technology, the rise of interest group politics, regulation and the adminis-
trative state, the pervasiveness of Alternative Dispute Resolution, and the 
globalization of markets, rights, and communication: all of which have led 
to at least three types of complex litigation. 
The first and most famous, now canonically inserted into all procedure 
courses, is the so-called “heroic model” that Richard Marcus writes about in 
today’s Symposium:34 the “domestic public law litigation” that Abe Chayes 
celebrated and the institutional reform litigation described by Owen Fiss.35 
In contrast to private law adjudication, public law litigation is prospectively 
focused, characterized by complex claims and structures, and by inquiring 
active judges who use injunctive powers to fix wrongful systems, like prisons 
and hospitals, with their goal being as much enunciation of public norms as 
resolution of private disputes. 
A second form of complex litigation, as Kenneth Feinberg reminded us 
at this Symposium, is “mass tort litigation.” Such litigation attempts to sort 
out large-scale disasters, toxic torts, and products liability imbroglios: 
ostensibly private lawsuits that are now increasingly infused with the public 
interest. While many of these cases are still resolved through tort litigation, 
just as often these days, some lead to the creation and distribution of mass 
tort compensation funds—like the 9/11 Fund, the BP Oil Spill Fund, and 
the Boston Marathon case—for each of which Kenneth Feinberg has 
become, quite literally, the master. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, I pointed to the rise of a third kind of 
complex litigation—“transnational public law litigation” 36 —in which 
transnational litigants bring a transnational party structure and a transna-
tional claims structure into domestic court. By so doing, they help generate 
judgments that can be used as judicially created bargaining chips in other 
political fora, with their aim generally being norm enunciation and trans-
portation of those norms to trigger institutional dialogue with political 
actors and to effect changes in public policy. 
 
34 Id. 
35 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1979). 
36 See Harold Hongju Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through 
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 TEX. INT’L L.J. 169, 195 (1987); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2348 (1991). 
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Increasingly, these transnational cases are playing a central role in our 
procedure curriculum. Iqbal,37 for example, was at bottom a 9/11 case, while 
our Transnational Civil Procedure canon now routinely includes such 
international cases as Daimler, 38  Goodyear, 39  McIntyre, 40  Helicopteros, 41 
Asahi,42 Volkswagenwerk,43 Aerospatiale,44 Bremen,45 and Piper.46  
Historically, the Federal Rules have shown remarkable flexibility in 
adapting to all three of these complex litigation paradigms: domestic and 
transnational public law litigation and mass torts. But these cases have also 
tested core architectural assumptions about whether trans-substantivity, 
uniformity, and simplicity are possible, and just as important, whether the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of these very different types of 
cases is actually achievable by a single set of procedural rules. If procedure is 
in fact power, do the Federal Rules still have power to ensure due process in 
this complex twenty-first century world of mass torts and transnational 
public law litigation? Can a single set of Federal Rules still ensure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action? And in this—what 
Subrin and Main now call procedure’s “fourth era”47 —to what extent will 
procedure end up dictating substance?  
In their contributions to this Symposium, Judith Resnik and Edward 
Purcell warn that procedural rules are increasingly used to divert important 
public law cases to settlement fora that refuse to enunciate public norms. 
Insensitive enforcement of procedural rules can foster unequal treatment 
among similarly situated parties and claims and thus discourage participa-
tion of the otherwise voiceless. Had Iqbal been the law, for example, the 
transnational public lawsuit that my Yale students and I undertook on behalf 
of Haitian refugees might never have made it into court.48 And, as Stephen 
 
37 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
38 Daimler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014).  
39 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
40 J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
41 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
42 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
43 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988). 
44 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
45 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
46 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). For a review of many of these decisions, 
see generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS (2008). 
47 Subrin & Main, supra note 7. 
48 The story of that frenetic litigation, now the subject of a number of twentieth-anniversary 
symposia, is recounted in BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: HOW A BAND OF 
YALE LAW STUDENTS SUED THE PRESIDENT AND WON (2005); BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, 
RODGER CITRON & MOLLY BEUTZ LAND, A DOCUMENTARY COMPANION TO STORMING THE 
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Burbank and Sean Farhang show in their penetrating article, restrictive 
readings of the Federal Rules can significantly limit meaningful private 
enforcement of public policy.49 
If what I have identified are the emerging trends in twenty-first century 
civil procedure, then which institution is best positioned to adapt the 1938 
Rules to the procedural demands of an era of globalization? Which institu-
tions should do less and which should do more to address pressing questions 
of procedural reform? As is often the case, where you stand on this issue 
depends on where you sit as a scholar. Some at this Symposium, whom I 
call the “procedural proceduralists,”50 tend to believe that procedural reform 
should be dictated primarily by the internal imperatives of the procedural 
system: that is, by measuring the procedural effects on particular cases that 
will be brought about by particular rule adjustments.  
“Meta-proceduralists,”51 by contrast, tend to believe—at a structural, 
holistic level—that procedural modifications inevitably influence substan-
tive macro-outcomes. Meta-proceduralists take a broader, systemic view, 
focusing on “the structures of procedure, a globally rationalist and reformist 
perspective, and liberal use of comparative and extra-legal materials” to 
understand the broader substantive impacts of procedural reform.52  
Despite these philosophical differences, the interests of these two 
schools converge when it comes to picking preferred authors of procedural 
reform. Neither would call for Congress to be the prime reformer of the 
Federal Rules, at least not in the first instance. Congress will not act in this 
area without interest group politics pushing it, and, unless its members have 
received detailed input from legal experts, the rules they will adopt will not 
likely be balanced with respect to opposing parties. While some legislative 
reform has been pro-plaintiff—for example, the Equal Access to Justice 
Act53 and the Class Action Fairness Act54—most of Congress’ contributions 
 
COURT (2009); Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 
YALE L.J. 2391 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, YLS Sale Symposium: Sale’s Legacies, OPINIO JURIS 
(Mar. 17, 2014, 11:54 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/17/yls-sale-symposium-sales-legacies/. 
49 Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014). 
50 The Reporters of the Rules, Edward Cooper and Richard Marcus, for example, are sterling 
exemplars of this category. 
51 See William Eskridge, Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 954 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT M. 
COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)). “Meta-proceduralists” include, 
for example, Edward Purcell and my Yale colleagues William Eskridge, Judith Resnik, Owen Fiss, 
and the late Robert Cover.  
52 See id. 
53 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2012). 
54 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2012)). 
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in this area have been strikingly anti-plaintiff, particularly the “Contract 
with America” legislation, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,55 
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act.56  
Nor has the Supreme Court made a strong case for being designated the 
preferred agent for procedural reform. If anything, procedural rules in a 
broad range of areas have been made muddier, not clearer, by recent 
Supreme Court rulings. The Justices are accustomed to deciding individual 
cases and controversies, and thus they tend to adopt “I know it when I see 
it” tests, based more on particularistic concerns driven by the facts of 
particular cases than on a systemic overview of the procedural system. 
 In the latest iterations of the Erie57 doctrine, for example, Shady Grove58 
held that Federal Rule 23 applies to displace any contrary state law, while 
Gasperini59 confusingly held that a federal court could apply a state’s stand-
ard for excessive compensation awards without detriment to the Seventh 
Amendment, so long as the federal judge applies a state review standard and 
is reviewed under an appellate “abuse of discretion” standard. While 
defining the scope of subject matter jurisdiction against foreign corpora-
tions under the Alien Tort Claims Act in the recent Kiobel decision, Chief 
Justice Roberts suggested that dismissal should turn on the amorphous test 
of whether the  claims “touch and concern” the United States.60 In Grable v. 
Darue, Justice Souter used even more perplexing imagery to opine that a 
missing cause of action was not “a missing federal door key, always required, 
but . . . a missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances.”61 In Iqbal, 
Justice Kennedy suggested the judges could determine plausibility by 
“draw[ing] on its judicial experience and commonsense,” a perfect illustra-
tion of an “I know it when I see it” mentality.62 But given, as Alex Reinert 
has pointed out, that judges now have far fewer trials and therefore less trial 
 
55 Pub L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. (2012)). 
56 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sec-
tions of the U.S.C.). 
57 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  
58 Shady Grove Orthopedics Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
59 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996). See generally Kevin M. Clermont, 
The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987 (2011) (discussing the two 
cases). 
60 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). But see Sarah H. 
Cleveland, The Kiobel Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 8 (2014). 
61 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318 (2005). 
62 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
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experience, how exactly are they supposed to acquire this requisite judicial 
experience and common sense?63    
In Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg pronounced that general jurisdiction 
should turn on whether a corporation is “at home,” without clarifying 
exactly what that term means.64 Yet during the recent oral argument in 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, Justice Ginsberg implied that Goodyear’s “home” 
was supposed to be limited to the corporation’s domicile or principal place 
of business.65 To which one’s obvious retort was, “Then why didn’t you put 
that objective test into the Goodyear opinion, rather than using the subjec-
tive term ‘at home,’ to describe the orientation of an artificial corporation 
that surely has no subjective feelings about when it is or is not ‘at home?’”  
What elevates this clutch of individual decisions into a broader culture 
of “plaintiphobia” is that the Justices have a set of concerns about a particu-
lar kind of case that they apply to whatever issue arises before them.66 They 
thus tend to doubly and triply compensate for their concerns about disfa-
vored lawsuits. Thus, when constitutional or human rights tort claims are 
brought against government officials, today’s judges tend first to question 
whether there is a legally cognizable right at issue. Citing Iqbal, they then 
suggest that whatever right exists was not pleaded with sufficient specificity. 
In a Bivens case,67 they decline to imply a right of action, and if immunities 
are pleaded, they tend to find immunity. They question the plaintiff ’s 
standing, and then, with respect to timing, they tend to conclude that it is 
not yet ripe, until it turns out that it has finally become moot. We see this 
most clearly in an Alien Tort case like Daimler, where different Justices 
suggested during oral argument that the case be dismissed for a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, and failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 68 So are the Justices really ruling 
on the most valid ground for decision or do they just dislike these cases, so 
that whatever ground happens to be the most insistently raised by defend-
ants will be the one the Court invokes to dismiss the case?69 
 
63 See Reinert, supra note 6. 
64 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
65 Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 
11-965), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/11-965_l647.pdf. 
66 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5. 
67 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
68 Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 
11-965), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/11-965_l647.pdf. 
69 See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965, slip op. at 22 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2014) (citing Kiobel 
for the proposition that “[r]ecent decisions of this Court, however, have rendered plaintiffs’ [Alien 
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If Congress and the Court should do less, who should do more? 
Let me suggest the professional “procedure community”: those stake-
holders in the formal federal rulemaking process, including such interested 
governmental entities as the Federal Judicial Center, private groups like 
academia, think tanks like the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, professional 
associations like the ABA, nongovernmental critics of the litigation process, 
and blue-ribbon legal organizations like the American Law Institute (ALI), 
which has done admirable work on aggregate litigation, transnational rules 
of civil procedure, and is now starting a long-term project to produce the 
Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 
We need more formal federal rulemaking on these issues, not higher 
standards of procedure set by the Supreme Court on a case or controversy 
basis without having first vetted them through the federal rulemaking 
process. Ironically, the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly directed that 
the best way to amend the Federal Rules is by formally amending the Rules, 
not through judicial interpretation.70 In 1993, the Court announced unani-
mously that a change to Rule 8 “must be obtained by the process of amend-
ing the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”71 Six years later, 
speaking of Rule 23, the Court declared that “we are bound to follow [the 
Rule] as we understood it upon its adoption,” and “are not free to alter it 
except through the process prescribed by Congress in the Rules Enabling 
Act.”72 Yet contrary to this directive, judicial interpretations spurred the 
heightened standards under Federal Rules 8, 23, and 56, without being the 
results of a careful formal, and inclusive federal rulemaking process. 
Why is formal federal rulemaking preferable to ad hoc rulemaking by 
the Court or Congress? First, it would help depoliticize procedure, which 
has become increasingly politicized in recent years. Second, a more formal 
process checks market ideology and the “case or controversy driven” triple-
counting orientation of the current Justices. Third, formal rulemaking has a 
quasi-administrative law feel, with the federal rulemaking committees being 
accorded a Chevron-style deference to their rulemaking expertise. Fourth, 
federal rulemaking is done in good measure by trial and appellate court 
judges, giving the judges who actually operate at the front lines of the trial 
process meaningful input into the evolution of the Federal Rules. Fifth, 
formal rulemaking permits interest-group politics but on a more constrained 
 
Tort Statute] and [Torture Victim Protection Act] claims infirm,” but proceeding nevertheless to 
hold that the case should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction). 
70 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., supra note 16, at 1737 (citing Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Nar-
cotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)). 
71 Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.  
72 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 (1999).  
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basis than the political free-for-all that now unfortunately infects our federal 
legislative process. Finally, precisely because formal rulemaking is slow and 
deliberate, it pushes towards consensus solutions. As Geoffrey Hazard’s 
Transnational Civil Rules project for the ALI demonstrates, a process that 
invites and weighs diverse inputs also allows for thoughtful global compari-
sons and for learning from other procedural systems.73 
Over seventy-five years, the formal federal rulemaking process has un-
deniably been slow, but on the other hand, it has become more inclusive. 
Because the rulemaking process provides for Congress to delegate rulemaking 
responsibility downward to, in turn, the Supreme Court, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, and the Reporters and Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Civil Rules, the rule changes that subsequently flow back upward 
tend to be fully vetted—and thus more likely to reflect consensus and less 
likely to generate controversy than ad hoc judicial rule changes. 
Take just one example: the “point–counterpoint proposal” for amending 
Federal Rule 56, which included testimony from experienced judges and 
empirical studies on differences in local rules and time-to-disposition.74  
After an exhaustive public comment process, the federal rulemakers con-
cluded, “it became clear that imposing the point–counterpoint procedure as 
the default national standard would be viewed as favoring defendants at the 
expense of plaintiffs,” in a way that was not apparent when the rule change 
was first proposed.75 And it is precisely because multiple decisionmakers 
must sign off on formal Federal Rule changes, as Hanna v. Plumer famously 
recognized nearly half a century ago, that formal Federal Rules have tradi-
tionally been given more deference than the “typical, relatively unguided 
Erie choice.”76 
None of this denies the need for tools enabling prudent judicial manage-
ment. As Don Elliott pointed out some years ago, many of the managerial 
 
73 Professor Hazard’s role in the ALI Transnational Civil Rules project is described in Koh, 
supra note *, at 1298-99. 
74 See Mark R. Kravitz, David F. Levi, Lee H. Rosenthal & Anthony J. Scirica, They Were 
Meant for Each Other: Professor Edward Cooper and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MICH. J.L. REF. 495, 
521-24 (2013). 
75 See id. at 522-23 (“Judges in districts that had tried point–counterpoint and abandoned it 
came to ask the Civil Rules Committee not to recommend a change to Rule 56 that would impose 
the procedure on a national basis. Judges with experience both in districts with it and without it 
made similar pleas.”).  
76 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (recognizing that when “the court has been instructed to apply the 
Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress 
erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the 
[Rules] Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions”). 
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judging tools that courts have evolved are akin to the “panda's thumb:”77 ad 
hoc evolutionary devices developed to deal with particular systemic prob-
lems, such as delay and litigant misbehavior.78 I have little doubt that 
increased attorney discretion led to the need to develop more tools of 
judicial discretion, many of which are now embodied in the Federal Rules. 
But as Subrin and Main note, those Rules originally celebrated equity and 
discretion.79  So how can wiser and more equitable discretionary standards 
be embedded into a more formal set of federal rule amendments? 
Here is where the legal academy, with its continuing deep engagement 
in the rulemaking discussion, can and should play a constructive role. Many 
rule revisions have been spurred by academic input. This Symposium’s 
papers on procedural scholarship show that empirical academic work has 
been extraordinarily useful in measuring the impact of Twiqbal, for example, 
and in testing commonsense judicial assumptions against empirical fact.  
But let me suggest that, going forward, the most important and useful 
scholarship may be neither domestic nor procedural. Other parts of the 
legal academy can bring to bear and integrate into procedure insights 
regarding the emerging law of transnationalism, cyberspace, and federalism. 
Law and society approaches to dispute resolution can call upon historical, 
comparative, and anthropological studies to explain better how dispute-
settlement methods are changing in different societies to respond to an age 
of globalization. And there is clearly a pressing need for interactive dialogue 
among the judiciary, Congress, and academics about complex issues of 
transnational and foreign relations law.  To take just one example, in the 
early 1980s, Judge Harry Edwards called for more academic scholarship on 
international norms when he and then-Judge Bork debated the meaning of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act in the Tel-Oren case.80 His call triggered a robust, 
decades-long debate among academics, Congress, the judiciary, and lawyers 
on human rights, procedure, and federal jurisdiction that continues to this 
day, and that has not abated despite the Supreme Court’s recent, confusing 
engagements with that statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain81 and Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.82 
 
77 See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA’S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN 
NATURAL HISTORY (1980).  
78 E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 
(1986). 
79 Subrin & Main, supra note 7. 
80 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
81 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
82 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
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It is time to accept a bitter truth: many of the intellectual concepts tradi-
tionally applied to procedure have lost their meaning in an age of globaliza-
tion. What, for example, do “minimum contacts” really mean in a world 
where commercial activity is increasingly accomplished by sending comput-
er signals? What significance should be given to the “physical presence” test 
of Burnham v. Superior Court83 when we are increasingly conducting personal 
and professional business in a virtual universe? What does it mean to talk 
about state courts intruding into the “territorial sovereignty” of sister states 
when modern international lawyers increasingly think of sovereignty not as 
simple defense of territory but as complex assertions of interest and influ-
ence within global regulatory fora?84 Is a defendant “purposefully availing” 
herself of the legal protections of a state when she “contacts” that state only 
via the Internet? And what is the “notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise an interested party of the pendency of the action”85 
in an age where even children can reliably send and receive text messages 
hundreds of times faster than a process server can accomplish in-hand service? 
One particularly useful academic field could be “comparative internaliza-
tion studies”: scholarly examination of the various legal techniques that 
different societies have employed to internalize and implement domestically 
the same international standards. In the trade area, for example, John 
Jackson and his colleagues have done an outstanding job showing how 
different nations internalized the international trade standards reached in 
the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of World Trade Organization negotia-
tions.86 During my time as Legal Adviser, Stephen Burbank and Linda 
Silberman worked assiduously with me on a parallel project to implement 
into U.S. law the Hague Convention on Choice of Courts, an important 
private international law treaty.87  That exercise convinced me that the 
Supreme Court’s recent nationalist jurisprudence in Medellin v. Texas88 has 
confused some parts of the procedure community, particularly the Uniform 
 
83 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990). 
84 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COM-
PLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Why 
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (reviewing CHAYES, supra; 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)). 
85 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
86 See JOHN H. JACKSON & ALAN SYKES, IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND (1997); 
JOHN H. JACKSON, JEAN-VICTOR LOUIS & MITSUO MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE 
TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984). 
87 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 629 
(2012); Stephen B. Burbank, Whose Regulatory Interests? Outsourcing the Treaty Function, 45 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 1037 (2013). 
88 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
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Law Commission, about exactly where current law requires the federal–state 
balance to be struck when implementing procedural treaty norms into U.S. 
domestic law. 
Finally, a more inclusive process would help us to address the difficult 
question of which aspects of procedure should be treated as private or 
public. To take just one example, in the 1993 Haitian refugee litigation, 
where I was counsel to the Haitian class plaintiffs, we won a permanent 
injunction after a trial ruling that under certain circumstances, aliens 
involuntarily detained in Guantanamo have due process rights.89 The U.S. 
government advised us that they would release more than 200 HIV-positive 
bona fide Haitian refugees being detained in Guantanamo, so long as we 
were willing to vacate that important precedential ruling by settlement. As 
public interest lawyers charged with zealous representation of our clients, 
we had no real choice. We had to secure the release of our Haitian clients, 
even if that meant a hard-won due process precedent that might be needed 
for future public interest cases would be vacated. And thus, fatefully, when 
the Bush administration decided in early 2003 to bring alleged Al Qaeda 
detainees to Guantanamo, there was no binding circuit precedent according 
them due process rights.90 
Today, however, that vacatur by settlement would be judicially scruti-
nized under the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage 
v. Bonner Mall Partnership,91 which raises the question of whether such 
lawsuits and the rulings they produce should be treated as a kind of public 
trust, as opposed to the private property of the litigants. Judge Young said 
at this Symposium that the lawsuit belongs to the litigants. But isn’t it 
equally true that when a litigation addresses important public norms—as do 
complex suits that fit the three complex paradigms that I have 
described—“domestic public law litigation,” “mass tort litigation,” and 
“transnational public law litigation”—we should also consider that case as 
the public’s lawsuit, which should not be pushed single-mindedly to settle-
ment without fuller appreciation of the important public values it may 
articulate? 
 
89 Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1041-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated by Stip-
ulated Order Approving Class Action Settlement Agreement (Feb 22, 1994). 
90 This story is recounted in GOLDSTEIN, supra note 48, at 298-300, 309-11, 373-75; GOLD-
STEIN, CITRON & LAND, supra note 48, at 220-33. 
91 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (“[O]ur holding must also take account of the public interest. ‘Judi-
cial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are 
not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the 
public interest would be served by a vacatur.’” (citation omitted)).   
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It was precisely because of this notion of class actions as a quasi-public 
trust that Federal Rule 23 was revised to require that “[t]he claims, issues, or 
defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or com-
promised only with the court’s approval.”92 Surely, there are some cases 
where the need for speedy dispute resolution may be far greater than the 
need for norm enunciation, but there are just as clearly cases where the 
opposite is true.  As we press to make procedural rules more efficient, we 
must also ensure that procedural rulemaking does not diminish our public 
judicial capacity to contest public norms openly and generate governing 
norms with substance on novel issues.93  In short, we must constantly ask 
not just, “How can we settle more cases?” but also, “What if they had settled 
Brown v. Board of Education?”94 Would the law, or the world, now really be in 
a better place? 
To conclude, the Federal Rules have partially achieved—but only partial-
ly—their own self-stated goal of the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action. That this goal remains partly unrealized is no one’s 
fault. In good measure, the Rules simply have not evolved fast enough to 
keep up with grand social change: stunning revolutions in technology, 
communication, globalization, and human rights. The steady march towards 
earlier dispositions has been understandable and acceptable, but only to a 
point. Going forward, we need to understand better how our procedural 
system writ large—not just individual rules—weighs the relative values of 
dispute resolution versus norm enunciation, and the relative concerns of the 
haves versus the have-nots. We need periodic systemic reform to keep the 
Rules relevant through a more inclusive process of federal rulemaking 
overseen by the professional procedure community, not through a welter of 
ad hoc judicial decisions and reactive legislation. 
When I first began teaching law more than three decades ago, interna-
tional law and procedure were considered a rare combination.  But over the 
years, my fields have merged. Increasingly, procedure is power, procedure is 
global, and rules of procedure will allocate lawsuits and decisions not just 
within the United States, but among fora scattered around the world.95 If 
litigants fail to get relief in U.S. courts, rest assured that they can and will 
go to other courts to get the legal interpretations they seek. They will use 
 
92 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
93 See Resnik, supra note 4. 
94 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
95 See, for example, the doctrine of forum non conveniens after Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 
454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
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these interpretations to generate political pressure to change the status quo, 
triggering what I long ago called “transnational legal process.”96  
At the end of the day, my message is simple: as U.S. law goes global, so 
too must its governing rules of procedure. And as procedure goes global, so 
too must go the procedure community that makes and revises these rules to 
make them fit a rapidly changing environment. That is how at least one 
internationalist invited to this seventy-fifth birthday party has come to 
think about these Rules we have all come to know so well. If we take the 
procedure community global over the next seventy-five years, it may still be 
possible, even in a time of breathtaking change, to achieve the enduring 
goals of the Federal Rules: justice, speed, inexpensiveness, equality, trans-
substantivity, citizen access, and the private enforcement of public policy.  
 
 
96 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). 
